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THE NATURE OF MORALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
John H. Crabb*
Currently on the international scene there is much competition
between the states of the world as to their moral reputation. Especially in the chancellories of the great powers there is much concern whether such or other event with international aspects, will
lead to a "propogandistic" victory on the part of its adversaries. That
is to say governments preoccupy themselves a b o u t the moral
appearance of their acts outside of law or outside of material consequences, or even without reference to such things. The purpose
of this little discussion is to examine this phenomenon of morality
in the relations between states and to form an opinion as to whether
it truly exists.
It is clear that it is not a new phenomenon, although it has received much emphasis at the present time. The anxiety of states
for the moral quality of their actions shows itself most vividly
in their attitudes concerning war. It appears that it has always
been recognized that war was the gravest recourse that a state
might employ, with its inevitable consequences of human death
and suffering. Hence, during all the course of history, no state
has committed itself to war without proclaiming that it had the
broadest justification for its action. It is sufficient to point to the
religious ceremonies of the Romans in the Temple of Janus, which
were necessary before commencing a just war, in order to indicate
that since the most ancient times have existed these preoccupations for the appearance of morality on the part of governments.
It has not been sufficient that a state have a merely juridical right
to wage war; moral provocation and reasons have also been necessary. But if this hypothesis is valid, it indicates that law and
morality in these respects are distinct phenomena, and that the
state has to take both into account.
Here, this analysis can be advanced by a consideration of the
duties of a state. In most fundamental terms, it can be said that
the primordial duty of the state is to protect and advance the
national interests. And the most fundamental interest is the tranquility of the state, including its physical security and the conAssistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota. This is a translation by the
author of his article originally written in Spanish and published in 6 Revista de la Facultad
de Ciencias Juridicas y Sociales de Guatemnala 3 (1058), under the title La Naturaleza
@

de la Moralidad en las Relaciones Internacionales.

1960]

MORALITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

'21

servation of its integrity and existence. Although it be admitted
that there are other legitimate national interests, almost all can be
referred ultimately to national security. Possibly it will simplify
discussion, without invalidating it, and without denying the existence of other national interests, if it is considered that the national
interests and the security of the state are the same thing. The
most essential duty of the state, then, becomes to concern itself
with its own physical security and political independence, on
behalf of its people.
But this interest in security does not have an absolute priority,
and cannot be pursued without consideration of other objectives
and, of certain limitations. The state must gain its security at the
cheapest price possible, and with the least interference with the
liberties and private well-being of its citizens, and futhermore has
to take into consideration the legitimate interests of other states.
It is, then, necessary to balance the interest in security against
other considerations, and every remote threat cannot require, if necessary to its elimination, that all these other interests be annihiliated, regardless of their validity or legitimacy. The state has to employ reasonable judgment to evaluate threats to its security, and
take expedients proportioned to such threats, and not extravagant or
unduly destructive of legitimate interests giving rise to a merely
remote threat. Life does not provide absolute security, only relative. Law and the obligation of treaties may impede a state from
unrestrained pursuit of its security. Nevertheless, the law never
requires that a state submit itself to an imminent or unreasonable
danger to its security.
An event in the history of the United States illuminates this
duty of the state. In 1792 there was in force between France and
the United States a treaty of alliance, directed against the common
enemy, England. But at that time France .was at war not only with
England, but also with a powerful coalition of the other principal
states of Europe. At this'time the Uprited States were not a large
power; their armed forces could not compare with the military
resources of Europe. It was evident that an-attempt by the United
States to assist France by entering the war against England would
have the probable result of a.disastrous defeat or even a complete
conquest of the United States by the English, and at the same
time their aid to France would not be appreciable. The American
statesman, Alexander Hamilton, rejecting the. idea that the treaty
with France was binding in such circumstances, said that there
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were no reasonable proportions between the dangers to which the
United States would be exposed and the benefits which the treaty
intended should insure to France by an entry of the United States
into the war. He added that good faith demands that reasonable
risks be incurred, but not such extraordinary and extreme risks.
Does one find here a conflict between morality and legal duty?
We have said that the primordial duty of the state is to protect its
integrity, but at the same time it is certain that morality demands
rigorously that solemn promises embodied in a treaty be loyally
fulfilled. But, would it have been admirable and. moral conduct
if the American State had submitted itself to an unreasonably
mortal peril for the vainglorious fulfillment of its solem promise?
To put such a question is to demonstrate that this duty to guard
the security of the state is moral also, and consequently, the obligation of the treaty seems -dryly legal and in derogation of
morality. It appears also that there were moral and juridical aspects.
in these contradictory obligations which confronted the American
State on this occasion.
'What, then, was the duty of the American State? According to
our hypothesis, it was to conserve its integrity, but with due consideration to other obligations and other interests-iri this case,
the treaty with France. No obligation or promise could constrain
it to compromise its security unreasonably, but at the same time,
it could not free itself from an obligation on the pretext of remote
possibilities of threats to its security which the fulfillment. of the
obligation might occasion. Then the duty of the state was to
formulate a reasonable judgment (or in good faith) whether or
not the discharge of the obligation toward France would involve
an undue peril to the state. The action of the state with reference
to its conflicting obligations would follow automatically or mechanically from the determination resulting from this application
of reason to the facts or circumstances. The essential or real duty
is, then, to apply reason to the facts, and subsequently to act in
conformity with such reasonable determinations. This duty requires only that the state employ all the prudence and knowledge
that is available to it, and it does not matter that the state may
perhaps be mistaken, so long as the resulting determination is the
most honest and reasonable one of which the state is capable.
According to the foregoing analysis, the legal duty and moral
duty are the same. If the state had concluded reasonably that
its entry into the war, in accordance with the terms of the treaty,
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would impose an intolerable menace to the existence of the state,.
its moral and legal duty was to stay out of the war. The possibility is not to be admitted that morality may demand that a state
take action in derogation of its legal duties. If on occasion such
may seem to be the case, it is only because analysis ha-. not been
followed to its logical conclusion, and the "moral" exigencies become only part of the ultimate facts to be considered in determining what is the legal duty. To discover the highest moral duty
then, one should search for the true legal duty in the case.
It follows, then, that in relations between states, there is no
difference between morality and law, and morality has no existence beyond that a state should fulfill its duties, and pursue its
actions within the limits of the law. If the conduct of a state is
called "immoral" it is only to say that it is not obeying the law.
And if it is valid to describe morality as something outside of,
beyond, or distinct from law, there would be no justification to
call such conduct "moral." Or if it is preferred to consider morality
as broader than law, and including it, then it leads to confusion
to call "morality" that which originates in the part of morality
which is the law. And in the second place, it would be unnecessarily inexact to call "moral" something which is legal or juridical,
because it would not be known if the reference was to that part
of morality which was included in law, or to that part of morality
which was outside of law.
It would be proper also to consider the role played by the
government and whether the concept of morality touches it relative
to the points of this discussion. Of course, the state acts solely
through its government, and generally its character is judged
by the actions of its government. It is proposed herc to imagine
the government as a lawyer or trustee-that is to say, a fiduciaryand the state as the client or beneficiary. The fiduciary has the
duty to protect and advance the interests of the client or beneficiary
to the best of his capacities and talents. The fiduciary is not a
judge of the interests of the beneficiary, but rather their advocate,
and in case of honest and reasonable doubt regarding the interests
of the beneficiary, he must contend for the position most favorable
to the interests of the beneficiary. Before formulating an opinion
about the rights of the beneficiary, the fiduciary should examine
the circumstances with the greatest possible objectivity and clarity,
but after forming his opinion of what are or could be the rights of
the beneficiary, the time for impartiality has passed, and his duty
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becomes to realize all the legitimate advantages which he believes
to be obtainable for the beneficiary. And it is necessary to emphasize that the advantages that the fiduciary pursues must be
legitimate, lest the acquisition, or even pursuit, of illegitimate
advantages impose on the beneficiary penalties or obligations, and
consequently which were things against his interests.
Many times it happens that prudence or policy requires that
f!l the advantages juridically obtainable not be pursued, because
of the expenses of the remedies, or the offense which would be
given to parties whose favor is worth more than the immediate
advantage. It is the occasion for "enlightened self-interest." But
even this has for its motive the interest of the beneficiary alone,
with a complete and legitimate indifference for the interests of
other parties, and does not touch upon generosity or "morality."
The fiduciary cannot exercise generosity with the interests or
property of the beneficiary, and if he does so, the fiduciary is in
dereliction of his duty. It is the same with a government and its
state. The character and worth of the fiduciary is judged accordincr to his effectiveness in conserving the interests of the beneficiary, always within the limitations of the law, and any "moral"
judgment of the fiduciary would touch solely on his loyalty toward
the beneficiary-that is to say, the fulfillment of his legal duty.
it is the same with a government and its state in matters relative
to international relations.
If the actions of the state cannot partake of qualities of morality, but only can be legitimate or illegitimate, it follows necessarily and logically that the anxiety of states for their reputations
is to show to the world that their governmental actions are legitimate. The concept of a state activity outside of law or self-interest
cannot exist. Matters relative to propaganda refer to opinions of
other states and their people that are not yet committed, or that
remain susceptible of being influenced for or against one's own
state. It follows then that a propagandistic victory consists in
proving to other states that one's own actions axe within one's own
rights, or that one's own interests concurr with those of these other
states. And on the contrary, a propagandistic defeat consists in
one's adversary being able to convince other states that one's own
state is mistaken regarding its own rights and that it has acted
in excess of them, or that its interests are logically opposed to
those of the state toward which the propaganda is directed.
It appears that the motive for the immemorial practice of states
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to imbue their. policies with an aura of morality is to stimulate
the enthusiasm of the people in support of such policies. It is
supposed that a dry explanation of purely juridical rights would
never provide the popular stimulus which is so necessary to rally
the people in support of the policies of the state. Besides, if one's
adversaries are going to make appeals to popular emotions and
sentiments for morality, it becomes necessary in one s own defense
to do the same, lest the people suspect that one's state doesn't
have a moral character. If this amounts to hypocracy, it is something outside this discussion. But it is probable that human nature
is such that it is not possible to eliminate completely the appeal
to morality in relations between states. But when animosities
become charged with elements of morality, they lead more to
intolerance and intransigent positions, and thus diminish opportunities for negotiation and reasonable discussion an d mutual
honorable accomodations which could arrive at an acceptable
composition of differences. One does not make pacts with outlaws.
Therefore, it is better, to the extent that human nature, permits,
to eliminate the concept of m6rality in international relations, which.
exists only subjectively, and to 1 e a v e the regulation' of such
questions to the arbitrament of law and its objectivity.

